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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
John Joseph Fairchild appeals from his judgment of conviction for grand theft, as
well as the denial of his motion for a new trial. He asserts that the district court erred by
denying his motion for a new trial because a portion of his trial, specifically, the
amendment of the information following jury selection, was held without his presence
and in chambers.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
On July 19, 2012, Angela Hilding was told that her "Gator," a John Deere ATV,
was missing from her barn.

(Tr., p.108, Ls.3-4.) She called the police, who arrived

about 45 minutes later. (Tr., p.108, Ls.23-25.)
That same morning, Kristi Jackson went out to her mother's barn; she opened
the doors and saw a Gator, which she had never before seen in the barn. (Tr., p.117,
Ls.10-25.)

She called her mother at work and she knew nothing about the Gator.

(Tr., p.119, Ls.11-15.) Ms. Jackson moved the Gator out of the barn and went out to
the pasture to get her horse when she saw Mr. Fairchild and Lonnie Dahl drive up in a
white pickup. (Tr., p.120, L.8 - p.122, L.13.) She saw them load the Gator onto the
trailer and leave the property.

(Tr., p.126, Ls.13-20.)

Later that day, she went to

Ms. Hilding's home and asked if she was missing a Gator. (Tr., p.110, Ls.4-6, p.128,
Ls.1-7.)
Christopher Jackson, who knew Mr. Dahl and Mr. Fairchild, confirmed that they
came to the property. According to Mr. Jackson, Mr. Dahl and Mr. Fairchild loaded the
Gator onto a trailer and drove away.

(Tr., p.144, Ls.10-16)
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As they drove away,

Mr. Jackson saw the GatOi fall off the trailer and one of the men loaded it back up.
(Tr., p:146, Ls.7-12.)

Mr. Fairchild was charged with one count of grand theft.

(R., p.90.)
After the voir dire of the jurors in this case, counsel and the court met in
chambers outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Fairchild, and the public. (Tr., p.68, L.24
~

p.69, L.8.) Mr. Fairchild had indicated that "he is willing to waive his appearance and

have you [defense counsel] make the decisions as it relates to the exercise of the
peremptory challenge." (Tr., p.69, Ls.1-8.) However, after the peremptory challenges
were made and while counsel were still in chambers, the State moved to amend the
Information.

(Tr., p.75, L.25

p.76, L.3.)

The initial Information alleged that

Mr. Fairchild wrongfully took or withheld the Gator, "with the intent to appropriate to
himself property of another." (R., p.91.) The State sought to amend the Information to
allege that Mr. Fairchild wrongfully took or withheld the Gator, "with the intent to deprive
another of property or to appropriate to himself the property of another." (R., p.122;
Tr., p.77, Ls.14-19.)

Counsel for Mr. Fairchild objected on the basis that the

amendment charged a different offense under I.C.R. 7(e).

(Tr., p.80, Ls.7-20.)

However, counsel asserted that Mr. Fairchild could not claim that he was unaware the
charge might be amended and, "I don't claim a lot of surprise here." (Tr., p.81, Ls.5-20.)
The court found that that the amendment did not charge a different or additional offense
and permitted the amendment. (Tr., p.82, Ls.1-6.)
Mr. Fairchild was convicted of grand theft, and the district court imposed a unified
sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (R., p.273.) He filed a motion for a new
trial. (R., p.234.) He asserted that the district court erred by conducting proceedings
outside of open court, erred by denying Mr. Fairchild's right to be present at trial, and
2

that the amendment was improper. (R., p.236.) In a supporting affidavit, Mr. Fairchild
asserted that he was never advised of the amendment, did not waive his right to be
notified of the amendment, and did not waive any right to be present at the discussion of
any amendment. (R., p.242.) He asserted that he only waived his right to be present
with respect to the peremptory challenges. (R., p.243.)
The district court denied the motion, holding that there was no objection by
counsel prejudice to Mr. Fairchild. (R., p.267; New Trial Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, Ls.24.)
Mr. Fairchild appealed. (R., p.278.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying
his motion for a new trial.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Fairchild's motion for a new trial?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Fairchild's Motion For A New Trial

A.

Introduction

Mr. Fairchild asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new
trial because a portion of his trial, specifically, the amendment of the information
following jury selection, was held without his presence and in chambers.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Fairchild's Motion For A New Trial
A decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard.

State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684 (Ct App. 1995). When a trial court's

discretionary decision in a criminal case is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:

(1) whether the lower court correctly

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989). Whether a district court

properly applies a statutory provision to the facts of a particular case is a question of law
over which this Court exercises free review.

State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849 (Ct. App.

1993).
Idaho law provides that a defendant in a criminal case, after having been found
guilty, may seek a new trial under certain limited circumstances. See I.C. § 19-2406.
Among those circumstances are, "when the trial has been had in his absence, if the
indictment is for a felony," and when the court has "erred in the decision of any question
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of law arising during the course of a trial." I.C. § 19-2406(1 ); (5). Mr. Fairchild asserts
that both of these circumstances are present here.
The first ground raised by Mr. Fairchild's motion for a new trial was that he was
denied a public trial because he was not present for the hearing on the motion to amend
the Information. (R., p.236.) The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial." This right is made applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278, 68 S.Ct.
499, 510, 92 L.Ed. 682, 696-97 (1948). Further, the Idaho Constitution provides, "courts
of justice shail be open to every person and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury
of person, property or character and right and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial, delay, or prejudice." IDAHO CONST. ART. I,§ 18.
'The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public
may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of
interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility
and to the importance of their functions."

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46, 104

(1984) (quoting Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n. 25). "In addition to ensuring that judge and
prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to
come forward and discourages perjury." Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. Waller sets forth the
procedures that must be followed before a criminal trial may be closed over a defense
objection:
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than
necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate
to support the closure.
6

Id. at 48. Because of the "great, though intangible, societal loss that flows frorn closing

courthouse doors,·· the denial of a right to a public trial is considered a structural error
from which prejudice is presumed. Id. at 49 n. 9. A violation of the right to a public trial
is not subject to harmless error analysis, and a defendant need not demonstrate specific
prejudice in order to prevail on appeal. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
Excluding the public from even a portion of trial proceedings constitutes a violation of
the Sixth Amendment right. See Presley v. Georgia,_ U.S.

130 S.Ct. 721 (2010)

(exclusion during voir dire).
The record in this case clearly shows that the proceedings involving peremptory
challenges and the amendment of the Information occurred in chambers and without
Mr. Fairchild's presence. (Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.69, L.8.) And while counsel can waive the
defendant's right to a public trial, see State v. Overline, 154 Idaho 214, 217-18 (Ct. App.
2012), the record discloses that the waiver in this case encompassed only the exercise
of the peremptory challenges.

(Tr., p.69, Ls.1-8.)

While the court noted that no

objection was made at the time, Mr. Fairchild raised this issue in the motion for a new
trial, which specifically permits motions for a new trial on this basis.

See I.C. § 19-

2406(1 ). Thus, Mr. Fairchild submits that the claims are preserved and that the district
court erred.
The district court denied the motion because Mr. Fairchild had not shown
prejudice and that the information would have been amended with or without
Mr. Fairchild being present. (New Trial Tr., p.26, Ls.8-25.) However, with this type of
error, prejudice is presumed and not subject to a harmless error analysis. See Waller,
467 U.S. at 49 n.9. Thus, the district court erred.
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The second ground pursued in the motion for a new trial was that Mr. Fairchild's
right to be present was violated. (R., p.239.) The right to be personally present at one's
trial for a felony or serious offense is embodied in the Sixth and Fourteen Amendments
of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho
Constitution.

State v. Carver, 94 Idaho 677, 679 (1972).

"Broadly speaking, a

defendant's right to be present in the courtroom at each stage of his trial has been
denominated a 'basic right' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. A violation of the right to be present is also
not subject to harmless error analysis. See id. at 680 (holding that a violation of a right
to be present during the empanelling of the jury is not subject to a showing of actual
injury or prejudice, and that injury is presumed).
Again, the district court held that Mr. Fairchild had shown no prejudice.
Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.20-23.)
instance is presumed.

(New

However, as with the public trial issue, prejudice in this

Thus, Mr. Fairchild submits that the district court erred by

denying the motion for a new trial on this basis as well.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fairchild requests that the district court's order denying his motion for a new
trial be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2014.

lie Defender
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